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Case no. 183~1 
APP~f,L.A.NT' S BRIEF IN STJPPO:R.T OF 
PRTITI0N FOR REHEARINr, 
INT:RODUCTORY NOTB 
The standard established by this Court for 
determining whether a petition for rehearinq is proper was 
expressea in Brown v. Pritchard, 4 Utah 2q2, 9 P. 573: reh. 
den. , 4 Utah '-q 2, 2<l 4, 11 P. 512 ( 18 R ~) : 
••• [To] justify a rehearing, a strong 
case must be mane. We must be convinced 
that the court failed to consiner some 
material point in the case, or that it 
erred in its conclusions, or that some 
matter has been discovered which was 
unknown at the time of the hearing. 
In Cummings v. ~eilsen, 42 ntah l~;, l 2Cl P. 619, 624 ( 1913), 
the Court stated: 
TO make an application for a rehearing is 
a matter of right, and we have no desire 
to discourage the practice of filing 
petitions for rehearings in proper cases. 
• • • [Al rehearing shoula not be applied 
for, unless we have rnisconstrueo or over-
looken some material fact or facts, or 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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have overlooked some statute or decision 
which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, or have either 
misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result. • • • If 
there are some reasons, however, such as 
we have indicated ahove, or other qoon 
reasons, a petition for a rehear1nq shouln 
be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court ( ~nhasis 
added). 
The argument portion of this brief will show that 
this petition for rehearing is properly before this Court in 
that this Court in its decision issued February 4, 1983, 
overlooked certain elementary rules of Bnglish usage and 
principles of logic which materially affect this appeal and 
misconstrued~ 5A-37-8(l)(a)(iv) in rendering its opinion. 
STATF!MENT OF THE NATUP.E OF THE CASE 
Respondent was charged with distribution of a 
controlled substance for value: to wit, marijuana, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann., E; SR-17-R(l)(a)(ii) (1()~1), as 
amended. 
nISPOSITION IN THE LOWBR COtlRT 
Respondent was tried before a jury on February 17, 
1982 in the Fourth Junicial District Court for Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson presiding. The 
trial court issued a final order granting nefendant-
respondent's Motion to DisMiss the Information. 
-2-
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RELIEF SOU'1HT ON .APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the granting of a rehearing or a 
summary reversal of this Court's February 14, 1983 necision in 
this case. 
STA""F,MF.l'~T OF 'r'HF. FAC'rS 
On October l~, 1Q81, respondent Robert Hicken was at 
the home of Jerry Middle ton in Provo, ntah, hoping to meet a 
new customer to whom he couln sell nrugs (T. 13). Mr. 
Middleton was working in cooperation with Sergeant Paul 
Markling of the Provo City Police Department (T. 13, 28, ~2). 
At some point in the day, Juny Smith, a Provo City Police 
DepartMent employee working for the netective's division, went 
to Mr. Midaleton's home and was met at the noor by Mr. 
Mindleton (T. 13). Miss Smith was acting under the 
instructions of Sergeant Markling ann was to attempt to buy 
some marijuana or cocaine from a third party (T. 11, 2R}. 
Miss Smith din not know Mr. Mindleton, nor was she aware he 
was actinq in cooperation with the police (T. 240. Mr. 
Middleton intronuced Miss Smith to respondent (T. 14l. 
Respondent asked Miss Smith how much she wanted to purchase, 
and after confirming the price and quantity with his "source" 
over the telephone, respondent aqreed to sell her two bags of 
marijuana for $~5 (T. 13-1~). 
Respondent instructed Miss SMith, Mr. Middleton and 
Mr. Middleton's little sister to get into Miss Smith's car and 
-3-
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follow respondent in his car (T. 16). At approximately llOn 
South and 50 Bast in Orem, responnent pullen over to the side 
of the roan and asken Miss Smith to qo with him to complete 
the previously negotiated sale while 1Ar. Middleton and his 
little sister waited in Miss Smith's car (T. l~). Respondent 
drove Miss Br.tith in his car to the home of his "source," Mr. 
Larsen (T. 17). 
Once inside, responnent explaine~ to Mr. Larsen that 
Miss ~mith, not respondent, was to purchase the marijuana (T. 
17). Mr. Larsen, followed by respondent, went into a hack 
room for a few minutes (T. 17). When they returned, 
respondent was carrying the marijuana. He examinen it, 
comrnentea that it was "really good stuff" and delivered it to 
Miss Smith (T. lR-l'l, 26). Miss Smith then paid Mr. Larsen 
~95, the previously agreed upon price (~. lQ). 
Respondent drove Miss Smith back to her car (T. 2n). 
She drove Mr. Mindleton ann his little sister back to their 
home, and then nrove to the police station where she reported 
to Ser~eant Markling and gave him the marijuana (T. 20). 
At trial, after the State rested its case, 
defendant-respondent Moveo to dismiss the Information claiming 
that in liqht of the evidence produced by the ~tate, 
respondent had been improperly charged unoer ~ 5R-~7-R(l)(a) 
(ii), the distribution for value subsection, and should have 
been chargen under~ 58-~7-R(l)(al(iv) which nef.ense counsel 
-4-
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characterized as the "arranginq statute" (T. 33-36). The 
State reasoned that because Utah's aiding and abetting 
statute, ~ '76-?.-2-2, provioes that an aider and abettor mav be 
charged as a principal, respondent was, in fact, correctly 
chargea because the eviaence clearly showed that he had aiaea 
in the distribution of a controllen substance for value (T. 
33-37). Despite the State's argument, the court rulen that 
the aiding and abetting provision, ~ 76-2-202 of the Criminal 
Code, did not apply to the Controlled Substances Act and 
therefore respondent could not be found guilty of the crime 
charged in the Information (T. 37). 
Appellant appealed the final jurlqment of dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 2~(c)(l) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
AP.~TJMP.NT 
The Court's opinion holds that respondent shouln 
have been charged with "arranginq a sale" under Utah r.oae 
Ann., E; SR-3'-R(l)(al(ivl (1~~3), as amended, and that Utah 
Cone Ann.,~ 76-2-202 (lq53), as amended, din not apply. '!he 
opinion is supported by the reasoning that the Controlled 
Substances Act expressly and specifically sanctions the 
offense of arranqinq for the distribution of a controlled 
substance and thereby displaces the general sanction for 
aioing and abetting providen for in ~ 76-2-202. In reaching 
-5-
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this conclusion, the Court has overlooked certain ele~entary 
principles of ~nglish usage and principles of logic which 
materially affect this appeal and has failed to discern the 
plain meaning of the statute. 
Utah Code Ann.,~ ~R-37-A(l)(a)(iv) (1953), as 
amended, must be read in its entirety for its meaning to 
become manifest. It states: 
(a) Except as authorizen hy this act, it 
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly 
ann intentionally: ••• 
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance for value or to negotiate to 
have a controlled substance distributed or 
dispensen for value ana distribute, 
nispense, or negotiate the distrihution or 
dispensing of any other liquid, substance, 
or material in lieu of the specific 
controlled suhstance so offered, agreed, 
consented, arranged, or negotiated 
(Emphasis added). 
For purposes of illustrative argument, subpart (iv) may he 
divided into three phrases, A, Rand C. Phrase A includes: 
To agree, consent, offer, or to arrange to 
distribute or disperse a controlled 
substance for value 
Phrase A is connectert, without punctuation, by the word "or" 
to Phrase B which reads: 
to neqotiate to have a controlled 
substance distributed or dispensen for 
value 
Phrase B is connected, without punctuation, by the word "and" 
-6-
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to the final phrase of the statute, Phrase c, which reaas: 
distribute, dispense, or neqotiate the 
distribution or dispensing of any other 
liquid, substance, or material in lieu of 
the specific controlled substance so 
offered, agreed, consenten, arranged, or 
negotiated. 
nemarcated as explained above, subpart (iv) appears as 
follows: 
TO agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance for value I or I to 
negotiate to have a controllea substance 
distributed or dispense for value / and I 
distribute, dispense, or negotiate the--
distribution or nispensing of any other 
liquid, substance, or material in lieu of 
the specific controlled substance so 
offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or 
negotiated (Fnphasis adoed). 
When the subpart is read as it is interpreted in the 
Court's opinion, the "or" which appears between :Phrase A and 
Phrase B is emphasized. So rean, the subpart proscribes the 
conduct "A" and also proscribes the conduct "B and c." 
The "or" emphasized by the Court, however, is not 
the only connective used in the statute. There are many. One 
of equal importance is the first "or" found in Phrase c. One 
of greater importance is the "and" which appears between 
Phrases B and c. When the subpart is read as interpreted by 
appellant, this "and" in con:iunction with Phrase C properly 
becomes the crux of the subpart. 
-7-
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Appellant's interpretation of the subpart is that it 
proscribes the condct "A and C" ana also proscribes the 
conduct "B and c." This is what the subpart savs when 
logically read. The conrluct "A" by itself is not proscribed 
by this subpart. That is, an agreement, offer, arrangement or 
consent to the distribution or dispensing of a controlled 
substance is not punishable by this subpart if standing alone, 
contrary to this Court's opinion. 
The reasons supporting appellant's interpretation 
are several and are based primarily upon rules of ~nglish 
usage and logic as these disciplines are related to the 
construction of the subsection. The first reason is that 
there is no punctuation between Phrase "A" and the "or" 
introducing Phrase "R." If there was a comma before the word 
"or", the Court's holding that Phrase "A" is a separate 
criminal sanction independent of Phrases "~" and "C" might be 
correct. '!'his would he consistent with the rule of Bnglish 
usage that requires that a co~ma be placed before a 
conjunction introducinq an indepennent clause. The absence of 
a comma before "or" indicates that Phrase A must be read in 
conjunction with Phrase C and is not a separate criminal 
sanction in and of itself. 
The second reason is that Phrase A is stated in the 
conjunctive in relation to Phrase C. Although the "or" 
irrlicates that Phrases A and B are stated in the disjunctive, 
-8-
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they are disjunctive only so far as they relate to each other. 
Phrase A is nonetheless stated in the conjunctive in relation 
to Phrase C, and similarly, Phrase R is stated in the 
conjunctive in relation to Phrase c. This is more easilv 
understood if it is rememberen that al 1 three phrases fol low 
from subsection (a) of the statute ana are all dependent 
c la use-s. Absent punctuation indicating otherwise, the use of 
the word "or" does not divorce Phrase A from the remainder of 
the sentence. 
The third and perhaps the most compelling reason 
sustaining appellant's interpretation of the subpart involves 
the parallel structure of the statute. Phrase C incorporates 
all the essential language of both Phrase A and Phrase B (with 
the exception of the "for value" requirement) ana also the 
"or" connecting those phrases. The "distribute or dispense" 
language of Phrase A is paired, again hy a disjunctive "or", 
with the "to neqot iate to have • • • distributed or dispersed" 
language of Phrase B. This language, identical in meaning, 
appears in Phrase C as "nistribute, dispense, or negotiate 
distribution or dispensing." 
After the above reiteration, Phrase C adds its own 
operative language, that being: "anv other liquid, substance, 
or material in lieu of." This is followed by the words "the 
specific controlled substance." This language of Phrase C 
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refers the reader directly hack to its parallel, the "a 
controllea substance" lanquage found in both Phrase A and 
Phrase R. Such syntax is not mere coincidence. 
That Phrase A of the subpart cannot be read alone is 
also clear from the Legislature's inclusion of the language 
"so offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or negotiated" in 
Phrase c. "Negotiated," as the Court imolied in its opinion 
in this case, clearly corresponds with "negotiate" as useo in 
Phrase B. The words "so offered, agreed, consented, arranged" 
in Phrase C clearly correspond with the "agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange" languaqe of Phrase A and are conclusive 
evidence that Phrase A and Phrase C are to be read together. 
This is the only reason languaqe from Phrase A wouln be 
repeated in parallel form in Phrase c. If the subpart were to 
be interpreted as the Court has in this case, this expression 
of coordinate ideas in similar form would be unneeded, 
irrelevant and confusing. Thus, it is apparent that Phrase C 
was meant to be read in conjunction with either Phrase A or 
Phrase B as the circumstances of the particular case miqht 
require. 
Drafting the suhpart in this way, so that it solelv 
applies where any other liquid, suhstance, or material in lieu 
of a specific controllea substance is involved, cannot be saia 
to be myopic on the part of the Legislature. The subpart 
addresses one problem, that known in the vernacular as a 
-10-
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"turkey buy." It addresses the problem in terms of a person 
performing the distribution or dispensing necessary for the 
"turkey buy" himself, and in terms of the person negotiating 
to have another perform the actual distribution or aispensing. 
The subpart makes reference to both controllen and counterfeit 
substances only because providing a counterfeit substance in 
lieu of a controlled substance is the essence of a "turkev 
buy." "Arranging" for the distribution of a qenuine 
controlled substance, as occurren in the facts of this case, 
is clearly proscribea by subpart (ii) of ~ 5R-37-8 of the 
Controlled Substances Act ann § 7~-?-~n2 of the Criminal Code. 
Section 76-2-202 is applicable to the Controlled Substances 
Act by way of Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-1-103 (1953), as amended. 
State v. ,Jeppson, Utah, 5411 P./.d 894 (1976). Subpart (iv) 
applies only to "in lieu of" distributions and dispensings and 
is therefore not in conflict with a finding of criminal 
culpability under the agency theory. 
'T"he Court's reliance on State v. Harrison, ntah, flnl 
P.2d 922 (1979), in conjunction with its distinction of State 
v. Jeppson, ntah, 546 P.?.d R94 (1C)7f'), is enlightening. In 
Harrison, at 293, this Court made the followinq statement in 
reference to subpart (iv) at issue here: 
A statute may le~itimately proscribe a 
broaa spectrum of cona.uct with a very few 
words, so long as the outer perimeters of 
such conauct are clearly nefined. The 
-11-
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statute in question accomplishes this by 
specifying that any activity leading to or 
resultinq in the distribution for value of 
a controlled substance must be engaged in 
knowingly or with intent that such 
distribution would, or would he likely to 
occur. Thus, any wittinq or intentional 
lending of aid in the distribution of 
druqs, whatever form it takes, is 
proscribed by the act (Bmphasis added). 
In the earlier case, Jeppson, the defendant was charged with 
aiding another because he hao knowingly and intentionally made 
his trailer available to persons unlawfully possessinq, using 
or distrihuting controlled substances therein. Id. at 895. 
The Court upheln the use of an aiding ana abetting instruction 
incorporatinq, in haec verba, the provisions of ~ ~~-2-20? on 
the basis that: 
It is applicable here, because the 
Controlled ~ubstances Act noes not 
specifically provide otherwise, nor does 
its context require otherwise. 
Id. at 896. In its opinion in this case the Court further 
elaborated: 
There are no provisions in the ntah 
Controllen Substances Act dealing with the 
offense of providing a place for illegally 
selling drugs, and therefore the 
provisions of the Criminal Code may be 
resorterl to. 
State v. Ricken, Utah, P.2d , filen Fehruarv 14, 
--
19R3, at 3 (1~~3). This distinction appears to be at odds 
-12-
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with the Court's declaration in Harrison. Unless one is to 
believe that providing a place for illegally selling drugs is 
not inclunea in "any witting or intentional lending of aid in 
the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes," Harrison 
arrl Jeppson are in conflict. That conflict, instead of being 
resolved by the Court's opinion in this case, is perpetuated 
., 
by it. 
Appellant submits that this conflict uouln be 
ef feet ively resolved if it were to apply the Jeppson precedent 
to the facts of this case and hold that respondent was 
properly charged with Distribution of a Controlled Substance 
for value in violation of Utah Cone Ann.,~ 58-37-B(l)(a)(ii) 
ana that subpart (iv) of. the statute applies only to sales 
involvinq suhstances distributed or disf)ersed in lieu of a 
controlled substance. 
CONCLUSIO~ 
Rased upon the foregoinq, appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court grant a rehearing in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of March, 1983. 
DAVID L. WILJ<ItlSON 
G eral 
7/v 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney r,eneral 
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CETlTIFICATF. OF MAIL1N(: 
I hereby certify that I mailen two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Rrief, postage prepaia, to Shelnen R. 
Carter, Attorney for Respondent, 35n East Center Street, 
Provo, Tltah, A46f'l, this Ath day of March, 19R3. 
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